NOTICE OF DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION - Plaintiff's Combined Responses & Combined Demands May 21, 2020 (2024)

Case

KUAR, KULWANT v. SINGH, DILBAG

Feb 07, 2012 |Scheduling Judge Trial |Tort-Other Negligence |Tort-Other Negligence |7676/2011

Case

Grazyna Budz v. The City Of New York, and, Edgar Fischer

Oct 27, 2022 |Kevin J Kerrigan |Torts - Other Negligence - City (Trip and Fall) |Torts - Other Negligence - City (Trip and Fall) |722689/2022

Case

MCKENZIE, ROY v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY et al

May 29, 2020 |Cohanim Lancman |Tort-Other Negligence |Tort-Other Negligence |722829/2022

Case

Carro, Katherine v. New Glen Oaks Nursing Home, Inc.

Feb 06, 2023 |Tracy A |Tort-Medical, Dental, or Podiatric Malpractice |Tort-Medical, Dental, or Podiatric Malpractice |702597/2023

Case

Estrada, Miriam Elizabeth v. Liberty Ashes, Inc et al

Nov 07, 2022 |Cohanim Lancman |Tort-Motor Vehicle |Tort-Motor Vehicle |723492/2022

Case

BERISHA, DAUT v. LIVE NATION WORLDWIDE, ETAL

Nov 10, 2014 |Lanzetta, Hon. Claudia |Tort-Other Negligence |Tort-Other Negligence |701284/2021

Case

Jarrel L Fraser, Gurvinder S Kandola v. Ariel B Abreu

Dec 16, 2023 |Timothy J. Dufficy |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |726637/2023

Case

BEGUM, ROWSHON v. GARRICK, ODAINE

Aug 16, 2023 |Cohanim Lancman |Tort-Motor Vehicle |Tort-Motor Vehicle |717029/2023

Case

Shernette S. Williams-Sawyer v. Joseph E. Lombardo

Aug 19, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |717078/2024

Ruling

FADLALLAH ADRIANA VS MCKEE ROBERT, ET AL.

Aug 21, 2024 |11/28/2022 |23SMCV01508

Case Number: 23SMCV01508 Hearing Date: August 21, 2024 Dept: N TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Adriana Fadlallahs Motion for Terminating Sanctions As Against Defendant Robert McKee, for Failure to Comply with Court Orders; and for Monetary Sanctions Against Defendant Robert McKee and His Counsel Ford, Walker, Haggerty and Behar is DENIED. Defendant Robert McKees Request for Monetary Sanctions is DENIED. Defendants Request for Monetary Sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $1,025.00, payable by Plaintiff Adriana Fadlallah and Plaintiffs counsel to Defendants Robert McKee, Oliver Holt dba Oliver Holt Landscape, and Estate of Oliver Holt and defense counsel within thirty (30) days of entry of this order. Plaintiff Adriana Fadlallahs Ex Parte Application for Nunc Pro Tunc Order and Increase of Monetary Sanctions is DENIED. Plaintiff Adriana Fadlallah to give notice. REASONING Plaintiff Adriana Fadlallahs Motion for Terminating Sanctions As Against Defendant Robert McKee, for Failure to Comply with Court Orders; and for Monetary Sanctions Against Defendant Robert McKee and His Counsel Ford, Walker, Haggerty and Behar Request for Judicial Notice Plaintiff Adriana Fadlallah (Plaintiff) requests judicial notice of the Courts order dated January 10, 2024. Plaintiffs request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d). Analysis Plaintiff moves for terminating sanctions against Defendant Robert McKee (McKee) in the form of striking McKees answer and affirmative defenses, entering his default, and allowing a default judgment against him for failure to comply with the Courts January 10, 2024 order requiring him to provide discovery responses to Plaintiffs Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Requests for Admission and pay monetary sanctions to Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel. Plaintiff argues that Defendant provided inadequate responses with meritless objections and no privilege logs, among other issues. If a party engages in the misuse of the discovery process, the court may impose sanctions including terminating, evidence, and monetary sanctions. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d).) Disobeying a court order to provide discovery is a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (g).) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery also constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (d).) The trial court has broad discretion in selecting discovery sanctions, subject to reversal only for abuse. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992 (Doppes).) [T]wo facts are absolutely prerequisite to imposition of the sanction: (1) there must be a failure to comply and (2) the failure must be willful. (Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. LcL Admrs, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1102, ellipsis omitted.) A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) The evidence provided with the opposition shows that McKee has served substantive responses that are compliant with the Courts prior order, such that terminating sanctions are not warranted. (Oppn, Wang Decl. ¶ 7, Exs. G-I.) Insofar as Plaintiff takes issue with the nature of the responses, the Court will not review each response individually and make a ruling as to each, as this is not a motion to compel further responses. Here, the Court need only determine whether the responses comply with the Courts prior order, and the Court finds that they do. Insofar as Plaintiff points to defense counsels purportedly inadequate discovery responses as to Defendant Estate of Oliver Holt, this is irrelevant to the Courts consideration here, as this motion is only made as to McKees responses. Accordingly, Plaintiff Adriana Fadlallahs Motion for Terminating Sanctions As Against Defendant Robert McKee, for Failure to Comply with Court Orders; and for Monetary Sanctions Against Defendant Robert McKee and His Counsel Ford, Walker, Haggerty and Behar is DENIED. McKee requests monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel for bringing this motion. McKees request is DENIED, as the motion itself was brought with justification, given that McKee failed to provide compliant responses before the motion was filed. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a).) Plaintiff Adriana Fadlallahs Ex Parte Application for Nunc Pro Tunc Order and Increase of Monetary Sanctions Request for Judicial Notice Plaintiff requests judicial notice of three court records in this action and the County of Los Angeles Auditor Controllers Special Warrant payment item TS 0034403493. Plaintiffs request is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) and (d). Analysis Plaintiff moves the Court for a nunc pro tunc order amending the monetary sanction award of $4,080 ordered in the Courts January 10, 2024 order naming defense counsel as Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, LLP in place of Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, as the entity required to pay sanctions, and to award additional monetary sanctions for the cost of this application. Plaintiff argues that defense counsel has refused to remit payment. The Court has reviewed its January 10, 2024 order and notes that it did not name defense counsels firm in its order except to repeat the name of Plaintiffs motion verbatim, and the Court merely stated that defense counsel was pay the sanctions with McKee. Plaintiff cites no authority for the Court to amend its order based on Plaintiffs own representation of the firms name. The Court also will not order further sanctions where the motion is being denied and Plaintiff has failed to provide authority for doing so. Thus, Plaintiff Adriana Fadlallahs Ex Parte Application for Nunc Pro Tunc Order and Increase of Monetary Sanctions is DENIED.

Ruling

Alicia Chapa vs Aamiya J. Arreaga et al.

Aug 19, 2024 |STK-CV-UPI-2023-0005389

Parties to appear in person or remotely. Department 10C is open for in person appearances. Should counsel/parties prefer to appear remotely, follow the instructions below. There is a dedicated conference bridge lines for Dept 10C. Call into dedicated conference bridge line at the time set for the hearing. To attend the remote hearing in Dept 10C: Call into (209) 992-5590, then follow the prompts and use the Bridge # 6937 and Pin # 6822.

Ruling

AMANDA PHAM VS LVMH MOET HENNESSY LOUIS VUITTON INC., ET AL.

Aug 21, 2024 |23STCV01213

Case Number: 23STCV01213 Hearing Date: August 21, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. TENTATIVE RULING DEPT: 32 HEARING DATE: August 21, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 23STCV01213 MOTIONS: Motion to Deem Requests for Admissions, Set One, to Plaintiff, Admitted MOVING PARTY: Defendant Louis Vuitton USA Inc. OPPOSING PARTY: Unopposed BACKGROUND Defendant Louis Vuitton USA Inc. (Defendant) moves to deem admitted Request for Admissions, Set One, served on Plaintiff Amanda Pham (Plaintiff). Defendant also requests terminating and monetary sanctions.[1] No opposition has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD Deem Admitted Where there has been no timely response to a request for admission under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.010, the propounding party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction.¿ (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).)¿ The party who failed to respond waives any objections to the demand, unless the court grants that party relief from the waiver, upon a showing that the party (1) has subsequently served a substantially compliant response, and (2) that the partys failure to respond was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.¿ (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subds. (a)(1)-(2).)¿ The court shall grant a motion to deem admitted requests for admissions, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.¿ (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).)¿ The Discovery Act does not define substantial compliance in the context of service of a proposed response that complies with Code Civ. Proc., section 2033.220. The courts have ruled that substantial compliance means actual compliance with all matters of substance and that technical deviations are not to be given the stature of noncompliance. (St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 779.) For example, unverified responses are not in substantial compliance. (Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636.) Additionally, RFA responses must be examined in their entirety. (St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 780.)¿¿¿ Where a party fails to provide a timely response to requests for admission, [i]t is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion.¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).) Terminating Sanctions To the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title, the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose&sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc. section 2023.030.) The court may impose a terminating sanction for misuse of the discovery process by any of the following: (1) An order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process; (2) An order staying further proceedings by that party until an order for discovery is obeyed; (3) An order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party; (4) An order rendering a judgment by default against that party. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030(d).) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery, or disobeying a court order to provide discovery, constitutes a misuse of the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subd. (d), (g).) The trial court may order a terminating sanction for discovery abuse after considering the totality of the circ*mstances: [the] conduct of the party to determine if the actions were willful; the detriment to the propounding party; and the number of formal and informal attempts to obtain the discovery. (Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 377, 390, quoting Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal. App. 4th 1225, 1246.) Generally, [a] decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction. (Los Defensores, supra, 223 Cal. App. 4th at p. 390 [citation omitted].) Under this standard, trial courts have properly imposed terminating sanctions when parties have willfully disobeyed one or more discovery orders. (Los Defensores, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 390 citing Lang, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1244-1246 [discussing cases]; see, e.g., Collisson & Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1617-1622 [terminating sanctions imposed (by striking the defendants Answer and subsequently granting default judgment) after defendants failed to comply with one court order to produce discovery]; Laguna Auto Body v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 481, 491, disapproved on other grounds in Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 478, n. 4 [terminating sanctions imposed against the plaintiff for failing to comply with a discovery order and for violating various discovery statutes].) DISCUSSION On October 16, 2023, Defendant served Request for Admissions, Set One on Plaintiff. (Galvan Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. A.) After granting extensions, Plaintiff served unverified responses on December 15, 2023. (Id. ¶ 4, Exh. B.) On May 8, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiffs counsels motion to be relieved, effective upon filing proof of service of the order on Plaintiff. The proof of service was filed on May 9, 2024. Plaintiff is currently self-represented. On May 16, 2024, Defendants counsel attempted to call Plaintiff via telephone. (Galvan Decl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff never responded to counsels voicemail message. Plaintiff has not made a general appearance in this case since being self-represented. On May 30, 2024, Defendant sent Plaintiff a meet and confer letter regarding the unverified responses, but Plaintiff did not reply. Id. ¶ 13-16, Exh. C.) Reviewing Plaintiffs responses to the Request for Admissions, the Court notes they contain substantive responses and thus, require a verification. Because [u]nverified discovery responses are tantamount to no response at all, (Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636), they are not in substantial compliance. Here, notice of the instant motion was served on Plaintiff via overnight delivery to the address indicated on the order to relieve counsel. No opposition has been filed for this motion. Accordingly, because the responses are not verified, the motion to deem admitted is granted as to the requests that do not contain only objections. Defendant seeks $1,650 in monetary sanctions against Plaintiff based on a $265 hourly rate and the $60 filing fee. Monetary sanctions are mandatory, but the amount requested is excessive given the type of motion and the lack of opposition. Therefore, the Court awards $457.50 in monetary sanctions against Plaintiff (1.5 hours of attorney time plus the filing fee). Defendant also requests that the Court impose terminating sanctions. However, there is insufficient evidence of discovery abuse to warrant terminating sanctions at this time. Additionally, Defendant has failed to show that less severe sanctions would not induce compliance. As a result, the request for terminating sanctions is denied. CONCLUSION AND ORDER Accordingly, Defendant Louis Vuitton USA Inc.s motion to deem admitted Request for Admissions, Set One served on Plaintiff Amanda Pham, is GRANTED. The Court further imposes monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in the reduced amount of $457.50. Said monetary sanctions are to be paid to counsel for Defendant within 30 days of the date of this order. Defendant shall provide notice of the Courts order and file a proof of service of such. TENTATIVE RULING DEPT: 32 HEARING DATE: August 21, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 23STCV01213 MOTIONS: Compel Responses to Request for Production, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Form Interrogatories, Set One MOVING PARTY: Defendants Louis Vuitton USA Inc. and Goya Studios, Inc. OPPOSING PARTY: None BACKGROUND Defendants Louis Vuitton USA Inc. and Goya Studios, Inc. (Defendants) move to compel Plaintiff Amanda Phams (Plaintiff) verified responses to Request for Production, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Form Interrogatories, Set One. Defendants seek monetary sanctions. No opposition has been filed. LEGAL STANDARD Interrogatories If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290 (b).) Failure to timely respond waives all objections, including privilege and work product, unless [t]he party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance and [t]he partys failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290 (a)(1), (a)(2).) The statute contains no time limit for a motion to compel where no responses have been served and no meet and confer is required when a party does not respond to discovery requests. All that need be shown in the moving papers is that a set of interrogatories was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served. (Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 905-906.) If a motion to compel responses is filed, the Court shall impose a monetary sanction against the losing party unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290 (c).) Further, [t]he court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).) Requests for Production Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 2031.300, if a party fails to serve a timely response to a demand for inspection, the party making the demand may move for an order compelling response to the demand. (Code Civ. Pro § 2031.300 (b).) The party who fails to serve a timely response to a demand for inspection waives any objection to the demand unless the court finds that the party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance or partys failure was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.300 (a)(1)- (2).) Courts shall impose a monetary sanction against any party who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to a demand for inspection unless the party acted with substantial justification or other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.300 (c).) Further, [t]he court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a).) DISCUSSION Here, on February 23, 2023, Goya Studios, Inc. served Request for Production, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Form Interrogatories, Set One on Plaintiff. (Galvan Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. A.) After receiving multiple extensions, Plaintiff served unverified responses which contain substantive responses on May 8, 2023. (Id. ¶ 5, Exh. B.) On October 16, 2023, Louis Vuitton USA Inc. served Request for Production, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Form Interrogatories, Set One on Plaintiff. (Galvan Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. C.) After receiving multiple extensions, Plaintiff served unverified responses which contain substantive responses on December 15, 2023. (Id. ¶ 9, Exh. D.) Therefore, because the responses do not solely contain objections, they need to be verified. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.250(a), 2031.250(a).) Since unverified responses are tantamount to no responses at all, the motion to compel is granted.[2] Defendant seeks $2,445 in monetary sanctions representing an hourly rate of $265 and the $60 filing fee. (Galvan Decl. ¶ 27.) The Court finds sanctions are warranted because Plaintiff has failed to respond. However, the amount requested is excessive given the type of motion, the lack of opposition, and the fact counsel can appear at the hearing remotely. Therefore, the Court awards sanctions in the amount of $457.50 (1.5 hour of attorney time and the filing fee). CONCLUSION AND ORDER Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Compel Request for Production, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Form Interrogatories, Set One is GRANTED. Plaintiff Amanda Pham shall provide verified responses within 20 days. The Court further GRANTS Defendants request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in the reduced amount of $457.50. Said monetary sanctions are to be paid to counsel for Defendants within 30 days of the date of this order. Defendants shall provide notice of the Courts order and file a proof of service of such. [1] It appears Defendant has filed two identical motions seeking the same relief under two different reservation numbers ending in 7977 and 4248. [2] The Court admonishes Defendants that each motion to compel must be separately filed. Failure to comply in the future may result in the Court striking an omnibus motion or otherwise declining to hear it.

Ruling

YADIRA KARLA LOMELI VS LUELLA MAE TAYLOR

Aug 20, 2024 |23PSCV03549

Case Number: 23PSCV03549 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 Dept: G Plaintiff Yadira Karla Lomelis Demurrer to Defendant Estate of Luella Mae Taylor Respondent: NO OPPOSITION TENTATIVE RULING Plaintiff Yadira Karla Lomelis Demurrer to Defendant Estate of Luella Mae Taylor is SUSTAINED with ten (10) days leave to amend. On the courts own motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436, the court GRANTS a motion to strike Defendant Estate of Luella Mae Taylors First Amended Answer filed August 9, 2024, as untimely and improperly filed. BACKGROUND This is a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision. In December 2021, Plaintiff Yadira Karla Lomeli was driving westbound on Gale Avenue in the City of Industry when Lomelis vehicle was hit by a vehicle driven by Defendant Luella Mae Taylor. On November 15, 2023, Lomeli filed a complaint against Taylor and Does 1-20, alleging causes of action for (1) motor vehicle negligence and (2) negligence. On December 5, 2023, Lomeli amended the complaint to replace Doe 1 with Defendant Estate of Luella Mae Taylor (the Taylor Estate). On July 12, 2024, the Taylor Estate filed an answer. On July 24, 2024, Lomeli filed the present demurrer. Prior to filing on July 18, 2024, Lomelis counsel telephonically met and conferred with the Taylor Estates counsel. (Capers Decl., ¶ 4.) On August 9, 2024, the Taylor Estate filed a First Amended Answer. A hearing on the demurrer is set for August 20, 2024, along with a case management conference. ANALYSIS Lomeli demurs to all affirmative defenses raised in the Taylor Estates Answer. For the following reasons, the court SUSTAINS Lomelis demurrer. Legal Standard An answer to a complaint must include [t]he general or specific denial of the material allegations of the complaint controverted by the defendant and [a] statement of any new matter constituting a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.30, subd. (b).) The same pleading of ultimate facts rather than mere legal conclusions required in a complaint is also required in pleading an answer. (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashimi (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384.) Defenses must be separately stated and refer to the causes of action they answer to. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.30, subd. (g).) A plaintiff can demur to an answer on the ground that [t]he answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20, subd. (a).) Generally speaking, the determination whether an answer states a defense is governed by the same principles which are applicable in determining if a complaint states a cause of action. (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal. App. 2d 725, 732.) The determination of the sufficiency of the answer requires an examination of the complaint because its adequacy is with reference to the complaint it purports to answer. (Id., at p. 733.) Discussion In this case, Lomeli argues each of the Taylor Estates twenty-seven affirmative defenses are insufficiently pled as they fail to allege any supporting facts. In response, the Taylor Estate has failed to file an opposition. Furthermore, it appears the Taylor Estate admits the demurrer has merit as the Taylor Estates counsel agreed to file an amended answer and did so, albeit in an untimely manner. (Capers Decl., ¶ 4.) Accordingly, Lomelis demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Lomelis demurrer to the Taylor Estates Answer is SUSTAINED with ten (10) days leave to amend. Furthermore, on the courts own motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 436, the court GRANTS a motion to strike the Taylor Estates First Amended Answer. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 472, subdivision (a), plaintiff may only amend a pleading once without leave of the court after a demurrer or motion to strike is filed but before the demurrer or motion to strike is heard if the amended pleading is filed and served no later than the date for filing an opposition to the demurrer or motion to strike. If a party seeks to amend the pleading after the deadline to file an opposition has passed, parties must stipulate to the filing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 472, subd. (a).)Here, the deadline to file an opposition to Lomelis demurrer was August 7, 2024, nine (9) court days before the hearing on August 20, 2024. Because the Taylor Estate did not file the First Amended Answer until August 9, 2024, it was untimely and improperly filed.

Ruling

RYAN CALDWELL VS VIRGINIA LOUISE BEABOA, ET AL.

Aug 20, 2024 |22STCV39573

Case Number: 22STCV39573 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 Dept: 32 PLEASE NOTE: Parties are encouraged to meet and confer concerning this tentative ruling to determine if a resolution may be reached. If the parties are unable to reach a resolution and a party intends to submit on this tentative ruling, the party must send an email to the Court at sscdept32@lacourt.org indicating that partys intention to submit. The email shall include the case number, date and time of the hearing, counsels contact information (if applicable), and the identity of the party submitting on this tentative ruling. If the Court does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may place the motion off calendar or adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. If all parties do not submit on this tentative ruling, they should arrange to appear in-person or remotely. Further, after the Court has posted/issued a tentative ruling, the Court has the inherent authority to prohibit the withdrawal of the subject motion and adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the Court. TENTATIVE RULING DEPT: 32 HEARING DATE: August 16, 2024 CASE NUMBER: 22STCV39573 MOTIONS: Motion to be Relieved as Counsel MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Ryan Caldwells Counsel OPPOSING PARTY: None BACKGROUND Plaintiff Ryan Caldwells (Plaintiff) counsel of record, Khashayar Eshraghi (Counsel), moves to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff. Counsel contends relief is necessary because there has been a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. No opposition has been filed for this motion. LEGAL STANDARD To be granted relief as counsel, counsel must comply with California Rules of Court (CRC) 3.1362. Even where grounds for termination exist, attorneys seeking to withdraw must comply with the procedures set forth in California Rule of Professional Conduct (CRPC) 3.700 and are subject to discipline for failure to do so. CRPC 3.700(B) lists various grounds for mandatory withdrawal. An attorney's right to terminate the attorney-client relationship and withdraw from a case is not absolute. (See Vann v. Shilleh (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 192, 197; People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398.) The decision whether to grant or deny an application for withdrawal is within the court's discretion, and it does not abuse that discretion by denying the application on the ground that the attorney's withdrawal would work injustice upon a third party. (Hodcarriers, Bldg. and Common Laborers Local Union No. 89 v. Miller (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 391.) The rules have been liberally construed to protect clients. (Vann v. Shilleh, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d 192.) An attorney, either with client's consent or court's approval, may withdraw from a case when withdrawal can be accomplished without undue prejudice to client's interests; however, an attorney shall not withdraw from employment until the member has taken reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client, including giving due notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, complying with rule 3-700(D), and complying with applicable laws and rules. (CRPC 3.700(A)(2).) A lawyer violates his or her ethical mandate by abandoning a client (Pineda v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 753, 758 759), or by withdrawing at a critical point and thereby prejudicing the clients case. (CRPC 3.700(A)(2); Vann v. Shilleh, supra.) DISCUSSION Counsel has filed forms MC-051 and MC-052 and has lodged with the Court a copy of the proposed order on form MC-053 as required. (Cal Rules of Court, rule 3.1362.) Counsel states the instant motion is filed for the following reason: This motion is based upon the grounds that there has been an irremediable breakdown in the attorney-client relationship that stands in the way of effective representation. (MC-052.) However, the declaration in support states that Plaintiff was served by mail. (MC-052, item 3a(2).) The declaration further states that counsel previously personally served client at his current address on July 1, 2024 with copies of the prior moving papers for a motion that was denied by the Court on July 16, 2024. Serving the client with papers for a previous motion does not provide notice of the hearing on this motion. When this matter was called for hearing, counsel requested additional time to file a proof of service. The Court continued the hearing. The Court has now reviewed the proof of service and observes that the address indicated does not contain a full zip code.[1] Accordingly, it does not appear that the motion was properly served on Plaintiff. In addition, counsel must also file an amended proposed order setting forth the dates set in this case. Moreover, the proposed order does not contain the correct Courthouse address. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion to relieve counsel. Counsel shall provide notice of the Courts ruling and file proofs of service of such. [1] The proof of service is also dated 8/16/24, rather than at the time of the mailing.

Ruling

ARMANDO MAY vs SANTA CRUZ BOARDWALK AMUsem*nT PARK

Aug 20, 2024 |24CV00369

24CV00369MAY v. SANTA CRUZ SEASIDE COMPANY (Incorrectly sued as Santa Cruz BoardwalkAmusem*nt Park) DEFENDANT SANTA CRUZ SEASIDE COMPANY’S DEMURRER TO AND MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT I. SUMMARY OF RULING As explained below, the court sustains the demurrer with leave to amend as to the causesof action for ADA violation, Unruh Civil Rights act violation, intentional infliction of emotionaldistress and unfair business practices. The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend as to thecauses of action for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and breach of the implied duty ofgood faith and fair dealing. The motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages is granted without leave to amend. Page 2 of 10 II. BACKGROUND/COMPLAINT Plaintiff’s verified complaint, filed 2/6/24, lists causes of action for violation of Title IIIof the ADA, violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress,breach of contract, promissory estoppel, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fairdealing, and unfair business practices. The facts alleged are that plaintiff Armando May drove from his home in Novato on8/6/23 to the Boardwalk to celebrate his daughter’s 11th birthday. He had previously purchasedfive unlimited ride wristbands online for over $300. The family’s 4-year-old autistic son was alsowith them and the complaint alleges he easily exceeded the minimum 42-inch height requirementfor certain rides. When the family got in line for the Space Ride, the ride operator refused theson’s entry based on the height requirement but the sign was improperly placed too high,rendering it an inaccurate height assessment. Plaintiff asked the operator to use a tape measurewhich was unavailable. The operator asked a supervisor to assist the family and they wererequired to step out of the ride’s line and wait at the exit. During this time the child “cried andwhaled [sic].” The supervisor allegedly refused to use a tape measure and the family wasescorted to guest services, their wristbands were removed, and they were provided a partialrefund of $67. They were extremely upset and thereafter the general manager offered them a fullrefund. Plaintiff alleges extreme humiliation, discrimination based on their son’s disability, andemotional turmoil as a result. III. MOTIONS Defendant demurs on the grounds that the first amended complaint’s causes of action areimproperly pled. Defendant moves to strike the punitive damages allegations on the grounds that facts ofmalice, oppression or fraud are not properly pled or could possibly be pled related to these facts. No timely oppositions were filed; in fact, plaintiff’s oppositions were filed a full weeklate without leave of court or any demonstration of good cause for missing the filing deadline.“[A] trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject late-filed papers. (Cal. Rules of Court,rule 3.1300(d).)” (Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2Cal.App.5th 252, 262.) The court declines to consider plaintiff’s opposition papers. Page 3 of 10 IV. LEGAL STANDARDS A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v.Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read theallegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) The court “treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all materialfacts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law ….”(Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects mustbe apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. MercuryIns. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not theevidence or other extrinsic matters; therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face ofthe pleading or are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70.) The only issueinvolved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected withextraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiaryfacts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff,as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth theessential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaintthe defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. LockheedAircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.) Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes ofaction, where some valid claim is alleged but “must dispose of an entire cause of action to besustained.” (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) “Generally, itis an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonablepossibility that the defect can be cured by amendment.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d335, 349.) Cal Code Civ Proc § 436, Improper matter or nonconforming pleading; Discretion ofcourt provides: “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time inits discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or impropermatter inserted in any pleading.” V. DISCUSSION A. Demurrer As explained below, it appears that each cause of action fails to state facts sufficient toallege a cause of action. Page 4 of 10 1. Violation of the ADA “To establish a violation [of Title III of the ADA], a plaintiff must show: (1) a covereddisability; (2) ‘the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of publicaccommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendantbecause of [the] disability.’ [Citations.]” (Martinez v. San Diego County Credit Union (2020) 50Cal.App.5th 1048, 1060.) Plaintiff’s cause of action under the ADA is insufficiently pledbecause defendant did not deny plaintiff any public accommodation and did not take actionbecause of plaintiff’s son’s disability. Plaintiff’s son was measured by the Space Ride operator and assessed to be too short togo on the ride. (Complaint ¶¶ 14-15.) Plaintiff’s son became very upset, a supervisor came tohelp, and plaintiff and his family were ultimately directed to guest services. (Complaint ¶¶ 19-21.) The general manager thereafter agreed to provide plaintiff with a full refund for theirwristband purchases, and plaintiff and his family left the premises. (Complaint ¶ 23.) Plaintiffalleges that the Boardwalk amusem*nt park is a public accommodation. (Complaint ¶ 31.) Healleges that his son has autism, a condition which significantly impairs the child’s major lifeactivities. (Complaint ¶¶ 32, 40.) The park denied plaintiff’s son access to the Space Ridebecause he was one inch short of the posted height requirement (Complaint ¶¶ 15, 18) anddefendant did not measure plaintiff’s son with a tape measure upon request. (Complaint ¶ 17.)Plaintiff alleges denying his son access to the ride was arbitrary, based solely on the son’sdisability, and in direct contravention of the ADA. (Complaint ¶ 32.) The complaint shows that defendant did not deny access to a place of publicaccommodation. Plaintiff and his family visited the Boardwalk, rode rides, and were deniedaccess to a single ride based on a non-discriminatory reason – the child’s height. The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. 2. Unruh Act To establish a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act a plaintiff must show thatdefendant either violated the ADA, or denied access to a business establishment based onintentional discrimination. (Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f); Martinez v. San Diego County Credit Union,supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at 1060.) Here, the complaint does not support a cause of action forviolation of the ADA or that any intentional discrimination occurred. Instead, the plaintiff’s sonwas denied access to a single ride based on his height. The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. Page 5 of 10 3. Intentional infliction of emotional distress A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is (1)extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or recklessdisregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe orextreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress bythe defendant's outrageous conduct. In order for conduct to be considered outrageous for thepurpose of tort liability, it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated ina civilized society. (Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal. App. 4th 768, 769.) Plaintiff alleges his child was not allowed on a Boardwalk ride due to a dispute as to thechild’s height, the child and the family were upset, defendant did not actually measure the child’sheight when requested, and then gave them a full refund when they expressed displeasure.(Complaint ¶¶ 46-47.) Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of discrimination fail to amount tooutrageous conduct; there are no allegations of inappropriate comments or conduct by theBoardwalk staff. The allegations do not describe outrageous conduct supporting a claim forintentional infliction of emotional distress. The demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. 4. Breach of contract The elements of breach of contract: (1) existence of the contract; (2) plaintiff’sperformance or excuse of nonperformance; (3) defendant’s breach; (4) damages to plaintiff as aresult of the breach. (CDC Firefighter v. Maldonado (2008) Cal.App.4th 1226, 1239.) The complaint fails to plead facts supporting a breach or damages. Plaintiff admits thatthe wristband provided access to the park and its rides, and that the only family member whocould not access a single ride was the child due to his height. Further, plaintiff was not damaged;plaintiff received a full refund of his park tickets. The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. 5. Promissory estoppel “The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are ‘(1) a promise clear and unambiguousin its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must beboth reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by hisreliance.’” (US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 901.)Promissory estoppel binds a promissor “‘when he should reasonably expect a substantial change Page 6 of 10of position, either by act or forbearance, in reliance on his promise, if injustice can be avoidedonly by its enforcement.’” (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1041.) The purpose of this doctrine is to make a promise binding, under certain circ*mstances,without consideration in the usual sense of something bargained for and given in exchange. Ifactual consideration was given by the promisee, promissory estoppel does not apply. (Youngmanv. Nevada Irrigation District (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 250; Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & LoanAss'n (1974) 10 Cal.3d 665, 672-673; Avidity Partners, LLC v. State of California (2013) 221Cal.App.4th 1180, 1209.) Here, since plaintiff paid consideration – the ticket prices – promissory estoppel cannotbe stated. The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. 6. Good faith and fair dealing The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied by law in every contract, and itacts “as a supplement to the express contractual covenants, to prevent a contracting party fromengaging in conduct which (while not technically transgressing the express covenants) frustratesthe other party's rights to the benefits of the contract.” (Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Department ofParks & Recreation (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1031-1032.) When the allegations for breachof the implied covenant “do not go beyond the statement of a mere contract breach,” thenthe demurrer to the implied covenant claim may be sustained on the grounds that it is duplicativeof, and entirely contained within, the corresponding breach of contract claim. (Careau & Co. v.Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 139.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant breached this duty when Boardwalk staff denied access tothe Space Ride to plaintiff’s son and asked the family to remove their wristbands and leave thepark. (Complaint ¶ 68.) These allegations are the same as plaintiff’s breach of contractallegations and therefore are duplicative. The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. 7. Unfair business practices “Business and Professions Code section 17200 (“UCL”) is written in the disjunctive[and] establishes three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, orunfair, or fraudulent.” (Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 632, 647.) Thethree prongs of the law have different thresholds. A “fraudulent” business act or practice is onein which members of the public are likely to be deceived. (Olsen v. Breeze, Inc. (1996) 48Cal.App.4th 608, 618 (“Fraudulent,” as used in the statute, does not refer to the common law tort Page 7 of 10of fraud but only requires a showing members of the public “are likely to be deceived”);Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211 (inorder to state a cause of action based on a fraudulent business act or practice, the plaintiff mustallege that consumers are likely to be deceived by the defendant’s conduct).) Plaintiff alleges fraudulent practices – “making a false representation (unlimited access torides and attractions) with the likely intention of deceiving the plaintiffs, leading them to actupon this misrepresentation to their detriment.” (Complaint ¶ 75.) Plaintiff has made noallegations that consumers are likely to be deceived, and therefore the demurrer is sustained withleave to amend. B. Motion to strike Under Civil Code section 3294, punitive damages may be awarded only when a plaintiffproves by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant has acted with “oppression, fraud, ormalice.” A motion to strike a request for punitive damages in a complaint may be granted whenthe facts alleged in the complaint, if proven, would still not support a finding of malice, fraud oroppression. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central Calif., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) Plaintiff’s allegations fail to support any wrongful, malicious, oppressive or wantonconduct by defendant; instead, the complaint alleges that the family was assisted by multiplelevels of Boardwalk staff and were offered a partial and then a full refund. Even if proven, thesefacts fail to support any finding of malice, fraud or oppression. The motion to strike is granted without leave to amend.Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if theprevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 8 of 10 LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: AUGUST 14, 2024 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

Ruling

Albert Seeno, III vs. Albert Seeno, Jr.

Aug 19, 2024 |C23-00614

C23-00614CASE NAME: ALBERT D. SEENO III VS. ALBERT D. SEENO JR. *HEARING ON MOTION IN RE: TO APPOINT DISCOVERY REFEREEFILED BY: ALBERT D. SEENO JR.*TENTATIVE RULING:*This motion is moot in light of the stipulation to the appointment of Judge Austin as a discoveryreferee.

Ruling

Manpreet Gill vs. Community Medical Centers, Inc.

Aug 21, 2024 |23CECG05021

Re: Gill v. Community Medical Centers, Inc. et al. Superior Court Case No. 23CECG05021Hearing Date: August 21, 2024 (Dept. 503)Motions: (1) By Defendant Charles Sohn, M.D. for an Order Compelling Initial Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One From Plaintiff Yadwinder Singh, and Request for Sanctions (2) By Defendant Charles Sohn, M.D. for an Order Compelling Initial Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One From Plaintiff Yadwinder Singh, and Request for Sanctions (3) By Defendant Charles Sohn, M.D. for an Order Compelling Initial Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One From Plaintiff Yadwinder Singh, and Request for Sanctions If oral argument is timely requested, it will be entertained on Thursday, August 22, 2024, at 3:30 p.m. in Department 503.Tentative Ruling: To grant each of the motions to compel initial responses to form and specialinterrogatories, and request for production of documents. Within ten (10) days of serviceof the order by the clerk, plaintiff Yadwinder Singh shall serve verified responses, withoutobjections, to Form Interrogatories, Set One; Special Interrogatories, Set One; andRequest for Production, Set One, and produce all documents responsive to the Requestfor Production of Documents. To impose monetary sanctions in the total amount of $547.50 against plaintiffYadwinder Singh, in favor of defendant Charles Sohn, M.D. Within thirty (30) days ofservice of the order by the clerk, plaintiff Yadwinder Singh shall pay sanctions todefendant Charles Sohn, M.D.’s counsel.Explanation: On January 30, 2024, defendant Charles Sohn, M.D. (“Defendant”) served thediscovery at issue on plaintiff Yadwinder Singh (“Plaintiff”). (E.g., Thelen Decl., ¶ 3, and Ex.A thereto.) As of the filing of the motions to compel, no responses have been served. (Id.,¶ 7.) No opposition was filed. Within 30 days of service of interrogatories, the party to whom the interrogatoriesare propounded shall serve the original of the response to them on the propoundingparty. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.260.) Within 30 days of service of a demand for inspection,the party to whom the requests are propounded shall serve the original of the responseto them on the propounding party. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.260.) To date, Defendanthas received no response to interrogatories and demands for inspection. Accordingly,an order compelling Plaintiff to provide initial responses is warranted. (Code Civ. Proc. §2030.290, subd. (b), 2031.300 subd. (b).) All objections are waived. (Id., §§ 2030.290, subd.(a), 2031.300, subd. (a).) Sanctions Sanctions are mandatory unless the court finds that the party acted “withsubstantial justification” or other circ*mstances that would render sanctions “unjust.” (Id.,§§ 2030.290, subd. (c), 2031.300, subd. (c).) As no opposition was filed, the court finds nocirc*mstances that would render the mandatory sanctions unjust. The court findscounsel’s rate of $245 per hour as reasonable, and imposes sanctions in $367.50 reflecting1.5 hours of attorney time in preparation of the present motion and $180.00 in filing fees,in favor of Defendant, and against Plaintiff. The sanctions imposed total to $547.50. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Proceduresection 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute orderadopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerkwill constitute notice of the order.Tentative RulingIssued By: jyh on 8/20/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

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